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O P I N I O N* 
    
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
 Plaintiffs, taxicab companies and their dispatch service (“Checker”), pleaded in 
the District Court that Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) had engaged in “unfair 
competition” by violating regulations regarding the licensure for commercial 
transportation.1 JA 106. The District Court granted Uber’s motion to dismiss the unfair 
competition claim,2 because Plaintiffs could not raise an unfair competition claim 
“premised on alleged violations of local laws and regulations, particularly where these 
statutes and regulations do not themselves provide private causes of action.” JA 10. On 
appeal, Checker argues the District Court erred, because it claims that Pennsylvania does 
in fact grant a private cause of action for enforcement of licensing regulations.3 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Checker also raised RICO and Lanham Act claims. 
2 The District Court granted the motion to dismiss Checker’s RICO claims and some of 
the Lanham Act Claims, but denied the motion to dismiss other Lanham Act claims. The 
parties subsequently stipulated to dismiss the remaining Lanham Act claims, and the 
District Court judge approved the stipulation. 
3 Checker argues that 66 Pa. C.S. §3309 grants it a private right of action.  
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 We need not consider whether state statute grants a private cause of action for 
enforcement of taxi licensing regulations, because Count One—the only Claim raised on 
appeal—was based solely on the Pennsylvania state law of unfair competition, not on any 
statutory private right of action. Whatever the breadth of unfair competition in 
Pennsylvania, state law clearly does not contemplate that violation of licensing 
regulations constitutes “unfair competition.” Thus, the District Court properly dismissed 
Checker’s unfair competition claim. 
 We have noted that the contours of Pennsylvania unfair competition law are not 
entirely clear. See Granite State Ins. Co. v. Aamco Transmission, Inc., 57 F.3d 316, 319 
(3d Cir. 1995); see also Giordano v. Claudio, 714 F. Supp. 2d 508, 521 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
But all unfair competition claims recognized by Pennsylvania courts involve some 
accusation of “passing off” of one’s own product as another, or a false or dishonest 
statement, or tortious interference with contract, or intellectual property theft. See Peek v. 
Whittaker, 2014 WL 2154965, at *10 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2014) (“[Unfair competition] 
contextually is limited to claims designed to protect a business from another’s 
misappropriation of its business organization or its expenditure of labor, skill, or money . 
. . .” (quotation and citation omitted)); see also Granite State, 57 F.3d at 319.4 Here, 
                                              
4 The unfair competition cases Checker cites for support primarily involve instances of 
theft or misappropriation of property. See Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 
F.2d 481, 490 (3d Cir. 1956); Pottstown Daily News Publ’g Co. v. Pottstown Broad. Co., 
192 A.2d 657, 663 (Pa. 1963); Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, 194 A. 631, 640 (Pa. 
1937); Babiarz v. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc., 2001 WL 1808554, at *9–10 (Pa. 
Com. Pl. July 10, 2001). The Pennsylvania cases outside this paradigm primarily involve 
false or misleading statements about a competitor. Carl A. Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. 
Schneider Dairy, 203 A.2d 469, 473 (Pa. 1964); Lakeview Ambulance & Med. Servs. v. 
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Checker has only alleged violation of state licensing regulations for taxi cabs as unfair 
competition. This in no way resembles the unfair competition claims recognized by 
Pennsylvania courts.5 
 Unsurprisingly, Checker urges that we expand the definition of unfair competition. 
More specifically, it argues that we should “forecast” that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would embrace a Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995) definition. It 
claims that the Restatement (Third) definition would bring the alleged regulatory 
violations under the umbrella of unfair competition.6  
 We disagree that the Supreme Court would embrace the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition as setting forth the Pennsylvania law. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has in fact said it is “difficult to imagine a modern court simply adopting 
something so broad-based and legislative in character as an outside organization’s 
                                                                                                                                                  
Gold Cross Ambulance Servs., Inc., 1995 WL 842000, at *2–3  (Pa. Com. Pl. Oct. 18, 
1995). Contrary to Checker’s assertion, Appeal of Douglass, 12 A. 835 (Pa. 1888) and 
Horn’s Motor Exp. v. PA Pub. Util. Comm’n, 26 A.2d 346 (1942) were not unfair 
competition cases. 
5 Checker argues that the District Court erred in noting that unfair competition law in 
Pennsylvania is the “equivalent of a federal Lanham Act claim.” Checker Cab 
Philadelphia, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 2016 WL 950934, at *4 n.10 (E.D. Pa. March 7, 
2016). While that may be somewhat imprecise, we need not engage in comparison for 
purposes of this opinion.  
6 Pressed at oral argument as to which provision of the Restatement Uber violated, 
Checker pointed to the “catch-all” provision of Section 1(a) of the Restatement, which 
states there is liability for “acts or practices of [an] actor determined to be actionable as 
an unfair method of competition.” In its brief, Checker further highlights Section 1 cmt. 
g, which states that an “act or practice is likely to be judged unfair only if it . . . otherwise 
conflicts with principles of public policy recognized by statute or common law.”  Also, 
Checker directs us to Comment (a) under Section 1 of the Restatement. We need not 
determine whether the Restatement would consider defendants’ alleged conduct unfair 
competition, for, as explained above, Pennsylvania has not adopted the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition.  
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Restatement of Law.” Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 353 (Pa. 2014).  
Furthermore, no Pennsylvania appellate court has embraced a Restatement (Third) 
definition of unfair competition. See Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am. v. Rotter, 535 F. Supp. 
2d 518, 526 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 Because Checker’s claims—rooted in alleged violations of state regulatory 
statutes—fundamentally differ from those sounding in unfair competition, we will uphold 
the ruling of the District Court.7 We find this result not only compelled by precedent, but, 
like other courts before us, preferable to having “federal judges . . . interpret[ing] and 
enforc[ing] municipal regulations” regarding taxi licensure. Dial a Car, Inc. v. Trans., 
Inc., 82 F.3d 484, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted). 
 Accordingly, we will affirm. 
                                              
7 Checker claims the District Court abused its discretion in denying it leave to file a 
second amended complaint. But, as Checker conceded at oral argument, it only motioned 
to amend its complaint if the District Court granted reconsideration. Because the District 
Court did not grant the motion for reconsideration, it did not err in refusing to allow 
Checker to amend its complaint.  
